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# **COMMISSIONERS**

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AZ CORP COMMISSION DOCKET CONTROL Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED

DEC 15 2010



# BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE FORMAL COMPLAINT OF CHARLES J. DAINS AGAINST RIGBY WATER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. W-01808A-09-0137

RIGBY WATER COMPANY'S POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM

Pursuant to the Procedural Order dated November 16, 2010, Rigby Water Company ("Rigby") respectfully submits its post-hearing memorandum in this matter. This memorandum addresses (1) the application of A.A.C. R14-2-406 (F) and (M) to the circumstances revealed by the evidence at the hearing of this matter, (2) Rigby's compliance with the Arizona Corporation Commission's regulations, (3) the impact of Complainant's malfeasance on Rigby's compliance efforts, and (4) the Arizona Corporation Commission's jurisdiction with respect to the main extension agreements of a public service corporation being condemned by a municipality.

Under the facts and circumstances presented at the hearing, Rigby has complied with the rules of the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission"). Alternatively, the Commission should find that any purported, technical non-compliance by Rigby is excused as a matter of law, because the Complainant actively precluded compliance with the Commission's regulations, despite being fully informed of those regulations. Because Complainant cannot use its own misdeeds to frustrate Rigby's ability to comply with Commission regulations and then attempt to twist that situation to Complainant's own

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financial benefit, the Commission should enter an order finding that Rigby has complied with Commission Rule R14-2-406 and denying the relief sought by Complainant.

## I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

Rigby has provided public water service in the Avondale area for approximately 30 The Complainant, Mr. Charles J. Dains ("Mr. Dains"), was the developer of the Terra Ranchettes Estates ("Terra Ranchettes") located in Rigby's Certificate of Convenience and Necessity ("CC&N") in Avondale, Arizona. [See Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:13-16; Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Charles D. Dains ("C. D. Dains" or "Mr. Dains Jr." in non-citation) at 1:12-19; Ex. CCD-1 (map).] Mr. Dains (along with others) purchased the land for the Terra Ranchettes development in or about 1985. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of C. D. Dains at 2:1-5; Trans. 34:15-20.] While Mr. Dains' estate now alleges that Terra Ranchettes was not developed until the mid-1990s due to Rigby's non-compliance with certain regulations, the evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Mr. Dains never actually requested service at that time. [Trans. 36:8-22 (Mr. Dains made informal inquiries of Rigby, but no formal request).] Mr. Dains' estate now claims that no request was made because Rigby was not in compliance with all applicable regulatory requirements. However, the evidence actually reveals that Rigby's compliance status was irrelevant to development. [See Ex. RWC 16 (March 19, 1985 letter from Rigby copied to Mr. Dains indicating that Rigby was prepared to provide water service to the proposed subdivision); see also Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 6:8-13 (Mr. Dains able to complete development while Rigby addressed storage compliance issues); Trans. 135:7-136:3 (Rigby was in compliance in early 1990s).] Mr. Dains simply chose not to develop

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The pre-filed direct testimony of witnesses is referred to as "Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of ," with following references to the page and line numbers of that pre-filed testimony. Testimony taken at the hearing shall be referred to as "Trans.," with following references to the page and line numbers of the referenced transcript. Hearing Exhibits shall be referred to as "Ex. ." Rigby's pre-filed exhibits, RWC 1 through RWC 14 were admitted as part of hearing exhibit R-1, and are referred to by their RWC designation for clarity.

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the subdivision, and subsequently chose not to do anything with the parcel for approximately ten years, including numerous years when Rigby was fully compliant.<sup>2</sup> Trans. 135:7-136:3, 71:3-11 (Mr. Dains chose not to sell or do anything with property), 72:5-9 (same).]

### A. The Development of Terra Ranchettes.

In or about 1995, Mr. Dains again approached Rigby about providing water service to the Terra Ranchettes subdivision. [Pre-Filed Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:13-14.] As Mr. Wilkinson, the president of Rigby and individual that directly interacted with Mr. Dains with respect to Terra Ranchettes' development, explained, Rigby agreed to provide water service to Terra Ranchettes, [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:5-6 (Mr. Wilkinson was principal contact with Mr. Dains); see also Ex. RWC 1 (January 25, 1996) letter from F. Wilkinson to C. Dains indicating Rigby would provide service to Terra Ranchettes)], but also informed Mr. Dains that he would need to comply with Commission regulations by entering into a mainline extension agreement with Rigby. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:13-20; Exs. RWC 1 (explaining that Rigby was a public service corporation subject to Commission oversight, and that those regulations required the parties to enter into a mainline extension agreement), RWC 2 (letter dated March 19, 1996 from F. Wilkinson to C. Dains enclosing executed water service agreements for subdivision and requesting Mr. Dains review applicable Commission regulations).] Mr. Wilkinson supplied Mr. Dains with a copy of those regulations. [Ex. RWC 1 (January 26, 1996 letter to Mr. Dains enclosing Commission regulations).]

Under those regulations, Rigby was required to enter into a mainline extension agreement with Mr. Dains. [Id.] Such an agreement had to meet the minimum requirements contained in A.A.C. R14-2-406. [Id.; see also Ex. S-2 (staff checklist of requirements for

Notably, Mr. Dains Jr. was not a party to any correspondence, conversations or meetings with Rigby. [Trans. 30:1-31:15; Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:7-12.] His testimony with respect to such interactions must, therefore, be accorded little weight in this matter.

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approval of mainline extension agreement).] Mr. Wilkinson informed Mr. Dains that the developer would need to install the infrastructure necessary to supply water to Terra Ranchettes. [Ex. RWC 1 ("The Agreement requires the applicant [Mr. Dains] to cause the water system to be constructed and the utility to refund the cost of the system to the applicant under certain terms and conditions"); Trans. 171:17-172:15 (Mr. Wilkinson provided Mr. Dains with a blank mainline extension agreement within weeks of being notified that construction had started).] In exchange, Rigby would refund an amount equal to ten percent of the amount of future water sales to the subdivision to Mr. Dains for at least ten years. [Ex. RWC 5 (mainline extension agreement), ¶ 16).]

Despite the numerous follow up discussions outlined by Mr. Wilkinson at the hearing, Mr. Dains did not respond to Rigby's requests to enter into a mainline extension agreement. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 6:15-24; Trans. 170:14-174:23 (detailing Mr. Wilkinson's interactions with Mr. Dains related to outstanding issues).] Nor did Mr. Dains provide any funds to Rigby as an advance in aid of construction. [Pre-Filed Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 16:4-6; Trans. 172:22-25.] Instead, in or about March 1996, Mr. Dains proceeded with the unilateral development of Terra Ranchettes, including installation of the water infrastructure. [Pre-Filed Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:21-27; Trans. 171:17-172:11 (Rigby's first notice of construction came through its field personnel's observation).] As conclusively demonstrated at the hearing, the infrastructure installed by Mr. Dains was necessary to meet the projected water demands of the Terra Ranchettes subdivision, not to benefit Rigby. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 5:1-6, 5:15-17 ("[t]he storage installed by Mr. Dains was necessary for the addition of the Terra Ranchettes subdivision); Trans. 132:22-133:19, 174:24-175:10 (Rigby did not use storage installed for Terra Ranchettes to comply with county requirements); Exs. RWC 8 (Samer & Assoc. report indicating that Terra Ranchettes addition necessitated additional storage capacity); RWC 15 (similar).] Mr. Dains completed construction of Terra Ranchettes in or about June 1997. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 4:21-25; Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of C. D. Dains at 3:14-17.]

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## B. Rigby's Efforts to Comply With Commission Regulations.

After construction was complete, Mr. Dains began selling lots to the public, [ex. RWC 7 (Application for Water Service dated July 14, 1997 for Mr. Dains' family residence)], and requested that Rigby begin providing water service to those lots.<sup>3</sup> [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 7:1-5; Ex. RWC 7.1 Because consumers were requesting service, Rigby began providing service to the subdivision despite Mr. Dains' refusal to enter into a mainline extension agreement. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 6:15-7:5; Trans. 179:14-180:6.] Rigby had no ability to force Mr. Dains to enter into a mainline extension agreement. [See, e.g., Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 6:15-24 (Mr. Wilkinson had to "hound Mr. Dains for nearly four years to get the mainline extension agreement signed"); Exs. RWC 1 (informing Mr. Dains of requirement in 1996), RWC 3 (letter dated July 21, 1998 from F. Wilkinson to C. Dains requesting that Mr. Dains enter into a mainline extension agreement), RWC 4 (letter dated February 19, 1999 from F. Wilkinson to C. Dains requesting execution of mainline extension agreement).] As Mr. Wilkinson noted in his testimony at the hearing, in hindsight, Rigby probably should have refused to begin providing service to Terra Ranchettes until the mainline extension agreement was executed and approved by the Commission. [Trans. 179:14-180:6 ("Well, knowing what we know now, we probably should have just not turned the valve on, but we were working closely with Mr. Dains").] However, Rigby (and its parent company) had never before encountered a developer that refused to execute a mainline extension agreement or provide the information necessary for Commission review and approval. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 16:21-17:5; Trans. 103:13-104:11, 167:3-16.] Accordingly, Rigby assumed operation of the Terra

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> As Mr. Dains Jr. admitted at the hearing, Mr. Dains accounted for the cost of the water infrastructure in the cost of the lots themselves. [See Trans. 31:25-34:10 (Mr. Dains Jr. admitting that sale of lots in development recouped, at a minimum, \$1.6 million); Trans. 60:19-61:15 (lot prices were set before parties entered into Agreement and Mr. Dains anticipated making profit on lots).] Mr. Dains' estate now seeks to double recover those costs. As discussed below, that effort should be rejected.

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Ranchettes system without an executed mainline extension agreement in place. [Trans. 179:14-180:6.]

In March 1999, nearly two years following completion of construction, and after the repeated follow up testified to by Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Dains finally negotiated and signed a form of Rigby's standard main line extension agreement (the "Agreement").4 [Ex. RWC 5.] Under the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Dains was to be refunded ten percent of the amounts received by Rigby from the provision of water to Terra Ranchettes for a period of twenty Contrary to Mr. Dains' allegations, the parties did not treat this vears. [Id., ¶ 16] transaction as a sale. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 15:23-16:19; Trans. 180:7-18.] The Agreement provided, consistent with Commission rules, that any amounts not refunded during that time would become an unrecoverable contribution in aid of construction. [Ex. RWC 5, ¶ 16.] Mr. Dains was fully aware of these provisions, as he had first been informed of their applicability in 1985 and subsequently provided the regulations in 1996, just three years earlier. [Exs. RWC 16 (letter dated March 19, 1985 from T. Macherione, with a copy to C. Dains, stating that "[w]ater service by Rigby Water Company is expressly conditioned upon the developers financing the cost of the project, conveyance of land titles and easements, and obtaining all necessary governmental approvals, including those required of, but not limited to, ... the Arizona Corporation Commission"), RWC 1 (January 26, 1995 letter from F. Wilkinson to C. Dains enclosing the regulations applicable to mainline extension agreements; "Agreement requires the applicant to cause the water system to be constructed and the utility to refund the cost of the system ... under certain terms and conditions").] Contrary to Mr. Dains' allegations, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the contemplated mainline extension agreement was anything

As Mr. Wilkinson testified, Rigby's standard form of mainline extension agreement has been filed with and approved by the Commission on several other occasions without issue. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 14:9-15; Trans. 147:20-148:12 (agreement has been approved seven other times); 169:3-14 (same).]

other than what it purports to be – a Commission compliant agreement intended to facilitate the orderly development of necessary water infrastructure.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Dains, who had designed and constructed the system, was obligated to obtain and provide the Approval to Construct ("ATC") required pursuant to A.A.C. R14-2-406(M) for approval by the Commission. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 13:22-14:7, 16:21-17:5 (Mr. Wilkinson informed Mr. Dains of requirement to provide ATC on multiple occasions); see also Ex. RWC 5, ¶ 6 (requiring Mr. Dains to construct water infrastructure in compliance with all applicable governmental regulations and to obtain "all applicable permits ... which may be required prior to construction ...").] Although there was no evidence on this point adduced at the hearing, Mr. Dains apparently obtained an ATC for the subdivision from the Maricopa County Department of Health in 1983. [See Ex. Dains 12 (late filed copy of 1983 ATC).] As Mr. Wilkinson testified, however, that ATC was never provided to Rigby, despite repeated requests. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 13:22-14:2; see also Trans. 55:25-56:11 (Mr. Dains Jr. admitting that he has no documentation indicating the ATC was ever provided to Rigby).]

Similarly, Mr. Dains never substantiated the costs of construction, as required by Commission regulations. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 13:22-27, 17:7-27; Trans. 49:16-51:5, 58:12-15 (Mr. Dains Jr. admitting that he doesn't know cost information was supplied to Rigby), 75:16-23 (Mr. Dains Jr. did not even attempt to obtain copies of invoices for hearing); Ex. Dains-4 (April 4, 1997 letter from F. Wilkinson to Mr. Dains requesting as-built drawings, construction invoices and testing results).] Instead, Mr. Dains

Mr. Dains has cited Rigby's provision of a mistaken pre-execution estimate of water usage and refund amounts to argue that Mr. Dains "sold" the Terra Ranchettes' water infrastructure to Rigby. [See Trans. 13:20-22 (counsel's opening statement).] As the evidence at the hearing demonstrated, however, Rigby provided Mr. Dains with the underlying data for that estimate. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 7:22-8:3; Ex. RWC 6 (actual estimate data supplied to Mr. Dains); Trans. 60:16-18 (Mr. Dains Jr. admitting receipt).] As a result, Mr. Dains was fully aware that he would likely not recover the costs of construction through the Agreement, and that he was not "selling" the infrastructure to Rigby.

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provided at least three conflicting cost estimates. [See Exs. RWC 5 (\$236,988.68), 13 (\$207,388.67) and 14 (\$204,414.34).] As a result of Mr. Dains' failure to meet his obligations under the Agreement, Rigby was unable to obtain Commission approval of the Agreement at that time. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 14:4-7; see Trans. 166:5-15.] Nonetheless, Rigby abided by its obligations under the Agreement and began making annual refund payments to Mr. Dains in 2000. [Pre-filed Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 9:13-13:2; Exs. RWC 9, 10.] Rigby has continued to make those annual refund payments, and Mr. Dains (and his estate) have accepted those payments every year since. [Pre-filed Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 9:13-13:2; Exs. RWC 9, RWC 10; Trans. 166:16-20 (despite not receiving Commission approval of Agreement, Rigby made annual refund payments required by Agreement).]

## Mr. Dains' Bad Faith Attempts to Profit From His Own Misdeeds.

Nine years after Rigby first began providing service to Terra Ranchettes, the City of Avondale (the "City") began publicly discussing the possible acquisition of Rigby. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 12:14-19; Trans. 64:4-65:11; Ex. R-2 (August 15, 2006 letter from Mr. Dains Jr. to Rigby discussing potential acquisition of Rigby by City).] In October 2006, Mr. Dains lodged an informal complaint with the Commission raising the same issues raised in this proceeding. [Informal Complaint materials docketed by Staff in this proceeding (6/2/2009).] In that informal complaint (and earlier demand letters), Mr. Dains sought, in essence, to rescind the Agreement and force Rigby to pay Mr. Dains the entire cost of constructing the water infrastructure for Terra Ranchettes, despite Rigby never receiving any funds from Mr. Dains. [Ex. R-2 (letter from Mr. Dains Jr. demanding a meeting to "discuss renegotiation of the Agreement ...").] The informal complaint that was filed with the Commission included a copy of the Agreement. [See Informal Complaint materials docketed by Staff in this proceeding (6/2/2009) (referring to packet of materials accompanying informal complaint).] Rigby responded to the informal complaint by providing an accounting of payments made to Mr. Dains to the Commission. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 12:21-25; RWC 9 (account statements provided to

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Commission).] The Commission took no action on Mr. Dains' informal complaint, and took no action with respect to approval of the Agreement. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 12:21-25; Trans. 189:9-20 (informal complaint was closed without Commission action).]

In January of 2009, the City filed a condemnation action against Rigby in Maricopa County Superior Court. [See Maricopa County Superior Court Case No. CV2009-003060.] Following that filing, and nearly three years after the initial informal complaint, Mr. Dains filed the present formal Complaint with the Commission seeking immediate repayment of all amounts spent installing the water infrastructure for Terra Ranchettes, plus interest.<sup>6</sup> [Formal Complaint (3/19/2009).] In response to the formal Complaint, Rigby re-filed the Agreement with the Commission. [See Docketed Notice of Filing (5/18/2009).] The Commission has still taken no action with respect to that filing, despite admitting at the hearing that Commission Staff had reviewed the Agreement and found nothing objectionable in it. [Trans. 191:20-192:5 (other than the lack of the ATC, no reason Agreement should not be approved), 196:1-7 (similar); see also Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 13:18-14:26.]

#### II. LEGAL ANALYSIS.

Mr. Dains' Complaint must be rejected because, as the evidenced adduced at the hearing demonstrates: (1) Rigby has complied with Commission rules, (2) Mr. Dains' own misconduct is the actual cause of the issues alleged in the Complaint, (3) Mr. Dains' Complaint is outside any possibly relevant statute of limitations, and (4) Mr. Dains' remaining claims, such as his unjust enrichment claim, are outside the jurisdiction of the Commission. In addition, the question of the Commission's jurisdiction pursuant to A.A.C.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> At the hearing, Mr. Dains' purported expert testimony and calculations supporting this request were stricken. [Trans. 7:24-8:8 (ruling striking testimony).] presented no additional evidence supporting the actual amounts spent constructing the [Trans. 75:16-23 (admitting that Complainant had not even infrastructure at issue. attempted to obtain copies of invoices substantiating costs).]

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R14-2-406(F) is more properly considered in docket W-01808A-10-0390, Rigby's pending request for cancellation of its Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, a docket that Mr. Dains has intervened in.

## Α. As Demonstrated at the Hearing, Rigby Is Fully Compliant With **Commission Rules.**

Commission Rule R14-2-406(M) provides:

All agreements under this rule shall be filed with and approved by the Utilities Division of the Commission. No agreement shall be approved unless accompanied by a Certificate of Approval to Construct as issued by the Arizona Department of Health Services. Where agreements for main extensions are not filed and approved by the Utilities Division, the refundable advance shall be immediately due and payable to the person making the advance.

The rule does not set a time limit for the filing and approval of a mainline extension agreement by the Commission. [See Trans. 190:12-15 (Mr. Morton agreeing there is no time frame for submission of mainline extension agreement).] The rule thus recognizes that various circumstances outside a public service company's control affect the timing of filing a mainline extension agreement and associated information required by the Commission.

Here, as detailed above, Mr. Dains' actions prevented the immediate filing and approval of the Agreement. Specifically, Mr. Dains (1) failed to timely execute the required mainline extension agreement, (2) failed to provide the required ATC to Rigby or the Commission, and (3) failed to substantiate the costs of the system as required by the Commission, while accepting the proceeds from the Agreement for nearly ten years before finally filing the present Complaint. There was no evidence presented at the hearing that Rigby failed to provide the Commission with all of the information at its disposal with respect to the Agreement.

Since the date of the hearing, Mr. Dains' estate has finally located and filed, as a latefiled exhibit, a copy of the original approval to construct, [ex. Dains 12], along with a memorandum from the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality dated May 2, 1996 indicating that the original approval to construct was still valid. [Dains 13.] The Agreement

has now been filed on at least two occasions with the Commission. To the extent these late filed materials satisfy Commission requirements, [see Ex. S-2 (Staff checklist)], Rigby is fully in compliance with R14-2-406(M) and is awaiting only Commission approval of the Agreement. Accordingly, an order recognizing that Rigby has complied with A.A.C. R 14-2-406(M) should be entered.

## B. Mr. Dains' Own Actions Preclude Relief on the Complaint.

Arizona law has long recognized that "[a] party to a contract cannot prevent the fulfillment of a condition precedent [or subsequent] and later rely on the failure of the condition to argue that no contract exists." Johnson Int'l, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 466, 471, 967 P.2d 607, 612 (App. 1998); see also Security Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Pre-Need Camelback Plan, Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 580, 582, 509 P.2d 652, 654 (1973) ("if one prevents fulfillment of a condition precedent one cannot thereafter rely on such failure of the condition to defeat the agreement"); Williams v. Nall, 4 Ariz. App. 416, 420, 420 P.2d 988, 992 (1966) ("one who prevents performance of a contract may not complain of such nonperformance"); Siegal v. Haver, 4 Ariz. App. 119, 122, 417 P.2d 928, 931 (1966) ("One waives the performance of a condition and cannot rely on it to prevent recovery where its non-performance is caused or consented to by him"); Holmes v. Graves, 83 Ariz. 174, 177-178, 318 P.2d 354, 356-57(1957) ( "[s]tatutory provisions enacted for the benefit of individuals may be so far waived by those for whose benefit they were enacted that they are estopped to insist upon their protection"); Rossi v. Hammons, 34 Ariz. 95, 101, 268 P. 181, 183 (1928) ("one who invites error is thereafter estopped from complaining of it").

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, consistent with Arizona law, makes clear that in circumstances where a party's performance is rendered impracticable or where it is frustrated by another party, the conditions of performance are discharged. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261, 265 (1981). Thus, Arizona law provides that a condition subsequent, such as Rigby's obligation to obtain approval of the Agreement, is discharged under the circumstances presented. Id., §261 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-

occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary"); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 666 (2004) ("Impossibility that arises directly or even indirectly from the acts of the promisee [here, Mr. Dains] is considered a sufficient excuse for the other party not performing, since one who prevents performance may not take advantage of the situation").

Mr. Dains (and his estate) cannot be permitted to profit from an alleged failure to comply with Commission regulations, where Mr. Dains actually frustrated Rigby's compliance with those requirements. When Mr. Dains requested service from Rigby in 1995 (and later entered into the Agreement), Mr. Dains assumed a duty of good faith and fair dealing to Rigby. Thus, Mr. Dains was obligated, at a minimum, to not frustrate Rigby's filing of the Agreement (and subsequent Commission approval), essential conditions subsequent to the Agreement. See Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 185 Ariz. 174, 176, 913 P.2d 1092, 1094 (1996) ("The duty of good faith requires that neither party act in a manner that would damage the rights of the other party to receive the benefits flowing from the underlying contractual relationship").

Accordingly, Mr. Dains could not, in good faith, frustrate and render impossible Rigby's efforts to obtain Commission approval. Rather than honor this obligation, however, Mr. Dains refused to supply the information necessary for Rigby to comply with Commission requirements, as set forth in detail above and throughout the record of the hearing. Compounding his bad faith, once Mr. Dains realized that his prior actions had prevented Rigby from obtaining Commission approval of the Agreement, Mr. Dains sought to take advantage of his own malfeasance by seeking an immediate refund of all amounts stated in the Agreement.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Mr. Dains' actions distinguish this case from Decision 66593, cited by Mr. Morton in his pre-filed testimony. As Mr. Morton admitted under questioning, in the Park Valley Water Company case, the complainant had not taken any action thwarting compliance with the Commission's regulations. [Trans. 192:6-113:12 (discussing material differences

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Requiring Rigby to immediately pay Mr. Dains an amount equal to the funds he allegedly expended in installing the Terra Ranchettes infrastructure, after Mr. Dains frustrated compliance, would be grossly inequitable and inconsistent with the public interest in solvent, stable public service corporations and orderly development and the intent of the Commission regulations. It would also encourage and reward bad faith behavior by the development community. Rigby's compliance with R14-2-406(M), including filing a copy of the ATC and substantiation of development costs, was necessarily conditioned upon Mr. Dains' good faith cooperation. Rigby obviously could not obtain approval of the Agreement because Mr. Dains refused to cooperate. Mr. Dains should not be allowed to manufacture a technical violation of Commission regulations for his own benefit, especially where Mr. Dains has accepted the benefits of the Agreement for ten years and only raised an issue when he found out that Rigby might be acquired by the City. Mr. Dains' (and his estate's) behavior in this matter justify an order that the requirements of R14-2-406(M), if not fully complied with, have been discharged as a matter of law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§261, 265.

## C. Complainant's Unclean Hands Also Preclude the Relief Sought.

Principles of equity likewise preclude the relief sought by Mr. Dains in the present case. The doctrine of "unclean hands" prevents a party who has acted in bad faith from seeking the assistance of a court or other governmental entity to reap the benefits of his or her bad faith actions. Dawson v. McNaney, 71 Ariz. 79, 86, 223 P.2d 907, 911 (1950). In other words, "[e]quity will not grant relief to one who has been wanting in good faith or good conscience or in fair dealing." Hamblin v. Woolley, 64 Ariz. 152, 161, 167 P.2d 100, 105-06 (1946) (quotation and citation omitted).

Here, as detailed above, Mr. Dains had the ability to prevent the filing, review and approval of the Agreement by the Commission. Mr. Dains did so. Mr. Dains' estate now

between Park Valley Water Company case and present situation).] Accordingly, that decision has no bearing on the issues in this matter.

seeks, in bad faith, to profit from Mr. Dains misconduct by having the Agreement rescinded and the full sum allegedly spent installing the water infrastructure for the Terra Ranchettes estate immediately paid to Mr. Dains' estate. Given that Mr. Dains has already admittedly recouped those funds through his sale of lots in the subdivision, [Trans. 31:25-34:10 (recouped, at a minimum, \$1.6 million from lot sales), 60:19-61:15 (sales prices anticipated profitable sales and were set prior to refund agreement with Rigby)], and has accepted the benefit of the Agreement for over ten years, [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 9:13-13:16; Exs. RWC 9, 10], Mr. Dains' unclean hands should preclude him from benefiting under the circumstances presented here.

## D. Mr. Dains' Complaint is Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Furthermore, Mr. Dains' Complaint, which purports to seek recovery pursuant to the authority of A.R.S. § 40-248 is barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in that statute. A.R.S. § 40-248 provides that "[a]ll complaints concerning excessive or discriminatory charges shall be filed with the commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues ..." Here, the actions complained of in the Complaint began, at the latest, upon the execution of the Agreement in March 1999, over ten years before the filing of the present Complaint.

Mr. Dains was aware of the purported causes of action stated in the Complaint no later than 2000, the year he first received a refund from Rigby. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 9:13-15 (Rigby began providing refunds to Mr. Dains in 2000); Ex. RWC 9.] Mr. Dains, however, did not seek to enforce his purported rights for over six years, despite having full knowledge of his potential causes of action. [Id.] Instead, Mr. Dains (and his estate) continued to accept and cash the annual refund checks from Rigby. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 9:13-13:16; Exs. RWC 9, RWC 10; Trans. 66:2-6 (Mr. Dains cashed annual refund checks prior to informal complaint).] Mr. Dains (and his estate) continued to cash such checks even after Mr. Dains' informal complaint was closed without action by the Commission. [Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of F. Wilkinson at 13:4-16 (Mr. Dains (and his estate) accepted and cashed annual refund checks between 2006 and

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2009); Trans. 67:16-21 (post-2006 checks cashed by Mr. Dains).] There can be no question that Mr. Dains' cause of action accrued, as a matter of law, no later than the filing of his informal complaint in 2006. Nonetheless, it took Mr. Dains nearly three additional years to seek formal relief, and then only in a transparent attempt to profit from the City's filed condemnation action. Accordingly, the two year statute of limitations found in A.R.S. § 40-248, the statute upon which Mr. Dains purports to base jurisdiction, bars this action.

## E. The Commission Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr. Dains' Remaining Claims.

Outside the purported, technical violation of A.A.C. R14-2-406(M) discussed above, Mr. Dains' Complaint essentially seeks private contractual relief. Mr. Dains' estate has focused on the City's potential acquisition of Rigby and any profits Rigby might make in such an acquisition. Indeed, the Complaint contains a claim for "unjust enrichment," but cites no statutory or other authority for the Commission's consideration of such a claim, because there is none.

Mr. Dains' Complaint essentially seeks civil remedies available through the Superior Court in this administrative tribunal. To the extent that Mr. Dains had any interest in the constitutionally mandated and protected condemnation proceeds to be paid by the City to Rigby, which he does not, Mr. Dains could have asserted that interest in the underlying condemnation proceeding. Instead, Mr. Dains seeks to leverage the Commission's oversight of Rigby into a cash payout in this docket and, now, in Docket No. W-01808A-10-0390. Mr. Dains has cited no jurisdictional basis for the Commission to provide civil relief. Nor can he. Absent such a basis, the remaining allegations of the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 339, 345, 404 P.2d 692, 696 (1965) (Commission's "authority must be found in either the Constitution or in statutes enacted by the legislature" because it has no implied powers); see also, e.g., Tonto Creek Estates Homeowners Assoc. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 177 Ariz. 49, 57, 864 P.2d 1081, 1089 (App. 1993) ("A decision rendered by the Commission which goes beyond its powers as prescribed by the constitution and statutes is subject to attack for lack of jurisdiction).

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# F. A.A.C. R14-2-406 Does Not Apply to the Present Circumstances.

Finally, A.A.C. R14-2-406 (F), has no applicability to this Docket. A.A.C. R14-2-406 (F) provides that:

The Commission will not approve the transfer of any Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity where the transferor has entered into a main extension agreement, unless it is demonstrated to the Commission that the transferor has agreed to satisfy the refund agreement, or that the transferee has assumed and has agreed to pay the transferor's obligations under such agreement.

Commission rule R14-2-406(F) is triggered by the transfer of a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity ("CC&N") from one private utility to another. There is no evidence in the record that such a transfer is contemplated or will occur. The City is a municipality authorized by law to provide utility service to its citizens without the need for a CC&N. A.R.S. § 9-511. In settling the City's condemnation suit, Rigby has agreed, even though Rigby believes the Commission's jurisdiction with respect to the resolution of a condemnation suit brought by a municipality is extremely limited under the statutory scheme, to seek <u>deletion</u> of its CC&N from the Commission. That deletion proceeding has been assigned Docket No. W-01808A-10-0390. Mr. Dains has intervened in that docket. In that proceeding, Rigby is not seeking a transfer of its CC&N to the City, but only the deletion of its CC&N. Accordingly, R14-2-406(F) has no applicability to either the deletion proceeding or this proceeding, and the Complaint's allegations in that regard must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Even if R14-2-406(F) somehow applied to the City's condemnation of Rigby, which it does not, the treatment of the Agreement is more properly addressed in the deletion proceeding, not this proceeding.

# III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

The Agreement has been filed with the Commission on several occasions. Further, Rigby has made numerous attempts to obtain the ATC from Mr. Dains in an effort to have the Agreement approved by the Commission. Until after the hearing in this matter, Mr.

1	Dains (and his estate) ignored Rigby's requests and unilaterally prevented Rigby from
2	obtaining Commission approval of the Agreement. Mr. Dains cannot be rewarded for his
3	own malfeasance. Accordingly, Rigby asks that the Commission enter an order denying any
4	relief to Mr. Dains and closing his Complaint without further action.
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6	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of December, 2010.
7	BRYAN CAVE LLP
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12	Phoenix, AZ 85004-4406
13	Attorneys for Rigby Water Company
14	
15	ORIGINAL and 13 copies of the foregoing filed this 15th day of December, 2010 with:
16	
17	Docket Control Division Arizona Corporation Commission
18	1200 West Washington Street
19	Phoenix, Arizona 85007
20	COPIES of the foregoing hand-delivered this 15th day of December, 2010, to:
21	
22	Lyn A. Farmer, Esq. Chief Administrative Law Judge
23	Hearing Division
24	Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington
25	Phoenix, AZ 85007
26	